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Digital assets are hot right now. Whether cryptocurrencies, 
like bitcoin, or initial coin offerings and tokens, this new asset 
class has captured the imagination of American investors. 
While it remains to be seen if this phenomenon has staying 
power, there is no doubt that these assets and their promoters 
have attracted the attention of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. But neither Congress nor the SEC has formally 
elucidated which digital assets are securities and which are 
not.   
This Article seeks to provide clarity in determining which 
digital assets are securities. It proposes two tests that 
operationalize the Supreme Court’s test in SEC v. W. J. Howey 
Co.  The first test is the Bahamas Test, which asks whether a 
digital asset is sufficiently decentralized such that it is not a 
security. The second test is the Substantial Steps Test which is 
used to determine whether an investment is made with an 
expectation of profit. This Article takes a rules-based approach 
to provide clarity and begin a conversation about crafting more 
predictable jurisprudence and regulation in this area.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Something potentially revolutionary is going on in the 
capital markets. Not since the Internet Bubble of the late 
1990s has there been such growth in new ways of raising 
money, coupled with such widespread public interest in new 
financial products. 
It began with crowdfunding.1 Entrepreneurs of all kinds 
realized they could use the Internet to appeal directly to 
investors or even their customers. This realization created a 
new market for funding ideas: the crowd. And while the 
market boomed for a bit, there were no clear and stable rules. 
The securities laws in place were, and still are, a product of 
the 1930s. Even though the laws have been continuously 
updated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
through rulemaking and guidance, this new approach to 
fundraising did not fit neatly into the regulatory scheme. The 
whole point of crowdfunding was to find a less expensive way 
of raising money. Forcing entrepreneurs to use existing, high-
cost registration methods was incompatible with the concept. 
 
1 Ajay Agrawal, Christian Catalini & Avi Goldfarb, Some Simple 
Economics of Crowdfunding, 14 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON 63 (2014). 
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But a regulatory Wild West was not appealing either.2 There 
was a risk of fraud, and also the possibility that low-quality 
offerors and offers would crowd out higher quality ones. 
Unfortunately, Congress and the SEC addressed the 
regulatory lacuna with a new set of rules that may not have 
been passed during the New Deal, but were certainly wedded 
to its precepts. To avail oneself of crowds to raise money, 
entrepreneurs had to navigate complex rules and use 
investment portals registered with the government.3 Not 
surprisingly, corporate crowdfunding has not yet evolved into 
a serious alternative source of financing.4 
The latest evolution in capital markets is cryptocurrency 
and other digital assets, which are addressed in this brief 
Article. Today, digital assets present both promise and peril, 
which makes the space similar to crowdfunding in the early 
2010s. In both cases, there has been no shortage of investor 
demand for new classes of assets or ways to participate in 
capital markets. Similarly, there has been no shortage of 
entrepreneurs who want to provide the public with those 
assets. There is, however, a shortage of intelligent rules and 
regulations that provide a clear and predictable framework for 
investors, issuers, and their lawyers. 
This shortage of regulatory certainty is, for some, a feature 
of digital assets. The high costs of accessing public markets in 
the United States has driven capital elsewhere—going public 
costs millions of dollars on average, and operating a public 
company has significant ongoing costs.5 While the 
 
2 But see generally TERRY L. ANDERSON & PETER J. HILL, THE NOT SO 
WILD, WILD WEST: PROPERTY RIGHTS ON THE FRONTIER (2004) (exploring how 
the Wild West was not as lawless as commonly portrayed, and had a stable 
institutional environment that encouraged cooperation and trade). 
3 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012); 17 C.F.R. pt. 227 (2018). 
4 See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, How Congress Killed 
Investment Crowdfunding: A Tale of Political Pressure, Hasty Decisions, 
and Inexpert Judgments that Begs for a Happy Ending, 102 KY. L.J. 865 
(2013). 
5 PWC DEALS, CONSIDERING AN IPO TO FUEL YOUR COMPANY’S FUTURE?: 
INSIGHT INTO THE COSTS OF GOING PUBLIC AND BEING PUBLIC 14 (2017), 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/deals/publications/assets/cost-of-an-ipo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MV65-MEV9] (“Two-thirds of the CFOs surveyed 
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government has responded with legislation aimed at 
promoting access to capital markets, such as the Jumpstart 
Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”),6 there is still 
demand for lesser-regulated, publicly-available investment 
products that is not matched by supply of those products. This 
demand is just one of many reasons for the increase in 
investment in digital assets, which include cryptocurrencies, 
initial coin offerings (“ICOs”), and other instruments. 
Another driver of this market is innovation, both 
technological and sociological. On the technological side, 
innovations like blockchains have made it possible to 
disintermediate financial and other institutions.7 These 
networks and the currencies that fuel them have value. 
Bitcoin is the most famous example of this—it is the modern 
world’s first and most successful experiment in a 
decentralized approach to money creation. There is growing 
demand for a digital-age money or a private store of value, 
which may in turn be fueling a demand for other private 
services that the state has traditionally policed. Whatever the 
reasons, once there is a private store of value—whether it is 
mackerel fillets,8 cigarettes,9 or bitcoin—it is natural for 
individuals to use it as a means of fundraising or investing. 
ICOs follow from bitcoin as IPOs follow from dollars. 
On the sociological side, individuals are rethinking how 
they interact with capitalists and entrepreneurs. The success 
of crowdfunding prior to regulation showed that individuals 
 
estimated spending between $1 million and $1.9 million annually on the 
costs of being public[.]”).  
6 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112–106, 126 Stat. 
306 (2012); see also H.R. REP. No. 113-53 (2013) (proposing the SEC 
Regulatory Accountability Act).  
7 See, e.g., David Yermack, Corporate Governance and Blockchains, 21 
REV. FIN. 7, 10 (2017) (“Making such powerful third parties obsolete and 
disintermediating financial transactions was the central goal of Nakamoto’s 
(2008) proposal for a peer-to-peer electronic cash system.”). 
8 Justin Scheck, Mackerel Economics in Prison Leads to Appreciation 
for Oily Fillets, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2008), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB122290720439096481 (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
9 See generally R.A. Radford, The Economic Organisation of a P.O.W. 
Camp, 12 ECONOMICA 189, 190–91 (1945).  
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are willing to participate in equity raises with mixed motives 
that include not only profit seeking, but also consumptive 
utility and charitable satisfaction. In a world in which social, 
environmental, political, and other attributes attach to 
investments, as well as an individual attachment between 
investors and the companies they provide capital to, there 
may be a need for new financial vehicles to satisfy this more 
nuanced demand. 
A final reason for the changing capital formation landscape 
is fraud and exuberance. As with any new technology, digital 
assets have opened the door for both bad and irrational actors. 
Vast amounts of money funneling into the space have created 
ripe conditions for a get-rich-quick mentality on the part of 
investors and cases of outright fraud on the part of promoters. 
There are already numerous examples of both.10 
Therefore, digital assets pose two fundamental problems to 
securities regulators. The first is an information asymmetry 
problem; the second is a police power problem. Information 
asymmetries are the animating force behind most securities 
regulation. The three pillars of modern securities law—
mandatory disclosure, strict anti-fraud rules, and insider 
trading limitations—are designed to put traders on an equal 
footing, regardless of whether they are inside or outside of a 
particular firm whose stock is being traded.11 This follows 
from the reality that market forces will not provide the 
optimal amount of information, and so the government must 
instead compel it. The antifraud rules in turn are designed to 
make any disclosures credible. 
The argument goes that in the absence of a way for issuers 
to vouch for their disclosures, the market will have a “lemons” 
 
10 See, e.g., SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 WL 4652121, at *1 
(E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2014); Michelle Fox, People are Taking Out Mortgages 
to Buy Bitcoin, Says Securities Regulator, CNBC (Dec. 11, 2017), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/11/people-are-taking-out-mortgages-to-buy-
bitcoin-says-joseph-borg.html [https://perma.cc/4Q67-L2R4]. 
11 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012)) (“To provide full and fair 
disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign 
commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, 
and for other purposes.”). 
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problem.12 After all, if fraudsters can make promises as easily 
as upstanding issuers, then good firms will leave the market 
because investors will confuse them with bad actors. If 
opportunities for fraud and exuberance are the primary 
drivers of these new digital asset markets, then the SEC has 
an important role in making these markets credible and 
efficient. 
The second issue is that even if investors have perfect 
knowledge of the assets they are purchasing, the government 
may still wish to prohibit purchase of these instruments. Such 
prohibitions can have any number of rationales, including 
national security, tax enforcement, or paternalism. States use 
their “police power” to stop gambling and a host of other 
activities they deem socially undesirable.13 The line between 
legitimate investment and illegal gambling is indeed hazy and 
often depends on social or moral judgments. After all, the 
moral difference between betting on whether the Chicago 
Bears will make the playoffs and betting on whether General 
Electric will make their earnings target for the next quarter 
is slight. Why the latter is universally permitted and the 
former only in limited circumstances is likely because of a 
view by government regulators that betting on stocks is “good” 
for society, while betting on sports and so on is “bad” for 
society. But, it is notable that this police power is not 
primarily enforced through securities laws. Gambling is 
banned by other laws, with the securities laws, in effect, 
providing a safe harbor for trading in stocks and bonds. 
It is still too early to tell exactly which of the drivers of 
digital asset excitement is dominant. This puts regulatory 
bodies in a tough position. Specifically, these new assets pose 
a problem for the SEC. More lax regulation of digital assets 
may give cover to bad actors, while the good actors are forced 
to contend with antiquated securities regulations. There has 
been a huge proliferation of digital assets, and both those 
products and the markets that trade them are changing 
 
12 See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
13 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-1101–09 (West 2012). 
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rapidly. It is unclear when and if this space will stabilize, but 
the reality is that digital assets as traded and marketed today 
do not fit into the regulatory dogmas of the quiet past. 
The SEC has entered into the fray largely through 
enforcement actions, consent orders, and informal guidance.14 
It has not, however, announced a rule-based, operational test 
for determining whether a digital asset is a security 
(“investment contract”) under Sections 2(a)(1) and 3(a)(10) of 
the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”).15 This lack of 
a bright-line rule maintains discretion and flexibility for 
regulators. 
 To this end, on April 3, 2019, the SEC’s Strategic Hub for 
Innovation and Financial Technology issued its Framework 
for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets (the 
“Framework”).16 It is not “Auer” job to determine how much 
weight to give the Framework.17 Instead, this Article will note 
the strong overlap its analysis has with the Framework.18 
 
14 See, e.g., CarrierEQ, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10575, 2018 WL 
6017664 (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-
10575.pdf [https://perma.cc/NM4X-66VV]; Paragon Coin, Inc., Securities 
Act Release No. 10574, 2018 WL 6017663 (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-10574.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
TJ3D-93DL]. 
15 See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 2(a)(1), 3(a)(10). 
16 Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION [hereinafter Framework], 
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysis-
digital-assets [https://perma.cc/99KD-XG4P] (last modified Apr. 3, 2019). 
17 See Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017), reh’g denied, 
880 F.3d 1378 (2018), cert. granted 139 S. Ct. 657 (2018) (granting certiorari 
to review whether the Court should overrule Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 
(1997) and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), two 
cases that direct courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of 
its own ambiguous regulation). 
18 An initial draft of this paper was published on October 17, 2018. See 
M. Todd Henderson & Max Raskin, A Regulatory Classification of Digital 
Assets: Towards an Operational Howey Test for Cryptocurrencies, ICOs, 
and Other Digital Assets (Oct. 17, 2018), https://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3265295 [https://perma.cc/L5AK-NCUW]; 
cf. Leibniz-Newton Calculus Controversy, WIKIPEDIA, 
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Where the Article primarily differs is in its proposal of a 
simple, rules-based test that will provide more certainty to the 
market.19 Such a test would not tie regulators’ hands with 
respect to ex post enforcement actions, preserving regulatory 
flexibility. 
This test will proceed under the existing SEC v. W.J. 
Howey Co. framework, which the Supreme Court and the SEC 
use to evaluate the jurisdictional sections of the relevant 
securities statutes.  Howey established that: 
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities 
Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby 
a person invests his money in a common enterprise 
and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the 
promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether 
the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal 
certificates or by nominal interests in the physical 
assets employed in the enterprise.20 
Simply stated, the four prongs of the Howey test that must 
be met for jurisdiction are: (1) investment of money; (2) efforts 
of others; (3) expectation of profits, and (4) common 
enterprise.21 
This Article’s two-step proposal offers a first cut at how 
digital assets of various types might be categorized within this 
familiar Howey framework. One part of the test will be 
immediately useful and operational—called the “Bahamas 
Test” herein. It makes a determination of whether a digital 
asset is sufficiently decentralized such that it does not satisfy 
the “efforts of others” prong of Howey and is therefore not a 
security. The second part of the test, determining whether an 
asset satisfies the “expectation of profit” prong of Howey, 
reveals the problems with applying the existing framework to 




19 It is beyond the scope of this Article to defend such an approach. For 
such a defense, see Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). 
20 SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946). 
21 See id. 
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Some tokens and cryptocurrencies—such as bitcoin—exist 
on decentralized, open source and permission-less platforms 
where there are no “others” to satisfy the final prong of the 
test, even though they may be purchased with the expectation 
of profit. These are not securities under the traditional Howey 
test, and in our view, they should not be regulated as such. 
The challenge comes in differentiating between digital 
assets and tokens that have been described as “utility” or 
“consumptive” tokens with those that have been described as 
“investment” tokens. The currently existing spectrum is 
between purely consumptive assets, mixed-motive assets, and 
purely investment assets. This has analogues in case law—
one simple example is a concert venue that sells tickets to a 
reseller who has no intention of using them other than to sell 
to the final consumers. This is not treated as issuance of a 
security.22 
This Article’s goal is to start—not end—the conversation 
about how to categorize crypto and other digital assets. The 
proposed “Substantial Steps Test”—to determine whether a 
purchase is made with an expectation of profit—is not without 
its faults and may militate towards a full rethinking of Howey.  
This Article begins with a brief description of the 
mechanics of digital assets and their limited regulatory 
history.  It then turns to our proposed Howey test for digital 
assets and examines a handful of cases under the two prongs.     
II. A BRIEF TECHNICAL ASIDE 
This Section provides a brief background on digital assets. 
The goal here is to provide a framework that will animate the 
regulatory analysis, not to give an encyclopedic account of 
these assets. 
The Section begins with the concept of open source 
software. The hallmark of open source software is that it has 
little to no intellectual property protections.23 The code can be 
copied and modified, and no legal recourse exists to the 
creator. A plethora of open source licenses append to software 
 
22 Other examples include personal seat licenses and condominiums. 
23 See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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programs. Bitcoin uses the MIT License,24 while Ethereum 
uses the Free Software Foundation’s License.25 Bitcoin’s 
license grants permission, free of charge, “to use, copy, modify, 
merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the 
[Bitcoin software.]”26 
Individuals are free to run whatever versions of Bitcoin or 
Ethereum software they choose to run. Through network 
effects, however, consensus is formed and dominant versions 
of software emerge as a result of the free choices of network 
participants. For instance, the two most popular versions of 
Bitcoin are the original Bitcoin network and a forked version 
called Bitcoin Cash.27 
 The most important aspect of open source software is that 
it is predicated on voluntary choice. Decisions made on which 
versions of software to run are open to anyone, and no legal 
barriers exist to participation in a network. Additionally, the 
intellectual property regime is much more liberal, and there 
are fewer claims which prevent the creation of new 
competitive instruments and networks. 
A second technical aspect worth discussing is the number 
of different ways to categorize the distribution methods of 
 
24 Bitcoin/COPYING, GITHUB, https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/ 
master/COPYING [https://perma.cc/EJD5-R34T]. 
25 Licensing, GITHUB, https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/ 
Licensing [https://perma.cc/N7YW-AYQQ]. But see Matt Savare, John 
Wintermute & Shailley Singh, Coders Beware: Licensing Issues Abound for 
Ether Apps, COINDESK (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/coders-
beware-licensing-issues-abound-ethereum-apps [https://perma.cc/T2PF-
XZG4]). 
26 Bitcoin/COPYING, GITHUB, https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/ 
master/COPYING [https://perma.cc/EJD5-R34T]. 
27 A “fork,” when referring to digital assets, is a change in software that 
not all parties agree to such that two competing versions of a network are 
created. See, e.g., David Farmer, What is a Bitcoin Fork?, COINBASE BLOG 
(July 27, 2017), https://blog.coinbase.com/what-is-a-bitcoin-fork-
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digital assets.28 This Article adopts the bifurcated typology of 
minting and mining discussed by Cohney et al.29 Assets that 
are minted are “created through an act of founder fiat.”30 The 
creator either uses a blockchain or some other method of 
issuance to create assets that are then sold to buyers, either 
using smart or more traditional contracts. This is an 
alternative to mining, in which those participating in a 
network receive digital assets in exchange for their 
involvement in the network.31 The important distinction for 
below is that with minting, the creator has rights and 
privileges with respect to the asset and network that the 
purchaser does not have. 
Finally, digital assets can be issued through a number of 
platforms that keep track of the asset ownership. 
Decentralized blockchains are one such method. No single 
individual or organization must hold the database that holds 
the asset ownership. Instead, the database exists on all of the 
nodes in the network running the software.32 Another, more 
traditional method of issuing digital assets involves 
centralized databases. Here, a single entity or entities that 
have permission maintain the database. 
 
28 E.g., PETER VAN VALKENBURGH, COIN CENTER, FRAMEWORK FOR 
SECURITIES REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCIES, 11–17 (2018), 
https://coincenter.org/files/securities-cryptocurrency-framework-v2.1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/22FV-GPVZ]. 
29 See Shaanan Cohsey, David A. Hoffman, Jeremy Sklaroff & David A. 
Wishnick, Coin-Operated Capitalism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2019) (manuscript at 29–30). 
30 Id. at 30. 
31 Id. at 29 n.91.  
32 See Daniel Cawrey, What Are Bitcoin Nodes and Why Do We Need 
Them?, COINDESK (May 9, 2014), https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-nodes-
need [https://perma.cc/YHA5-ME4X]. 
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III. SEC STANCE AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE 
The SEC has articulated its positions on digital assets 
through informal guidance,33 enforcement actions,34  and even 
a website that explains the perils of the ICO market and 
relays up-to-date information.35 Humorously,36 it also hosts a 
website promoting its own fake ICO called Howeycoin37 to 
demonstrate the problems with parts of the market.38 To date, 
there have been no rulemakings, either formal or informal. 
The SEC’s most significant policy statements on ICOs 
came in a speech delivered by William Hinman, director of the 
division of corporation finance and the Framework issued in 
April of 2019.39 While other commissioners spoke out about 
various issues in digital assets, Hinman was the first speaker 
to articulate a cognizable legal standard for classifying the 
assets. 
The speech sought to answer the following question: 
“[Whether] a digital asset that was originally offered in a 
securities offering [could] ever be later sold in a manner that 
does not constitute an offering of a security[.]”40 First, 
Hinman answers that when terms like “coin,” “token,” or 
 
33 See, e.g., Framework, supra note 16; Press Release, SEC, Statement 
on Digital Asset Securities Issuance and Trading (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/digital-asset-securites-
issuuance-and-trading [https://perma.cc/2EH3-AVJB]. 
34 See, e.g., supra note 14. 
35 See generally Spotlight on Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), U.S. SEC. & 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/ICO [https://perma.cc/Q2GB-
3HE4] (last modified Feb. 7, 2019). 
36 This Article uses this term relatively speaking. 
37 Howeycoins Pre-ICO Sale, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.howeycoins.com/index.html [https://perma.cc/VN2X-PCWU]. 
38 Press Release, SEC, The SEC Has an Opportunity You Won’t Want 
to Miss: Act Now! (May 16, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-
release/2018-88 [https://perma.cc/M5NF-VZHW]. 
39 See Framework, supra note 16; William Hinman, Dir., Div. Corp. 
Fin., SEC, Remarks at the Yahoo Finance All Markets Summit: Crypto 
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“ICOs” are used in an attempt to evade registration 
requirements, the SEC will treat them simply as securities 
with a straightforward Howey analysis.41 There are numerous 
examples of these types of assets.42 The second half of the 
speech, however, deals with instruments that may not be 
securities: 
If the network on which the token or coin is to function 
is sufficiently decentralized – where purchasers would 
no longer reasonably expect a person or group to carry 
out essential managerial or entrepreneurial efforts – 
the assets may not represent an investment contract. 
Moreover, when the efforts of the third party are no 
longer a key factor for determining the enterprise’s 
success, material information asymmetries recede. As 
a network becomes truly decentralized, the ability to 
identify an issuer or promoter to make the requisite 
disclosures becomes difficult, and less meaningful.43 
The most notable asset to meet this definition is bitcoin. 
Recognizing that such “sufficiently decentralized” digital 
assets may not be securities is an important foundational 
principle. But this raises a second question: how can the 
investment community know what Hinman and the SEC 
mean by “sufficiently decentralized”? No operational test has 
been offered, which is why this Article proposes the Bahamas 
Test. 
 The Framework focuses on the reasonable expectation of 
profits and efforts of others prongs of the Howey inquiry.44  
Instead of this Article's more rigid rules-based approach, the 
Framework lists a number of characteristics for determining 
whether a purchaser had a reasonable expectation of profit 
 
41 See id. 
42 See, e.g., CarrierEQ, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10575, 2018 WL 
6017664 (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-
10575.pdf [https://perma.cc/NM4X-66VV]; Paragon Coin, Inc., Securities 
Act Release No. 10574, 2018 WL 6017663 (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-10574.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
TJ3D-93DL]. 
43 Hinman Speech, supra note 39. 
44 See Framework, supra note 16. 
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derived from the efforts of others.45 In this standards-based 
approach, "no one of the . . . characteristics is necessarily 
determinative" but the "stronger their presence" the more 
likely the instrument is a security.46 The Framework then 
goes on to provide a long list of such characteristics.  Some 
examples of them are: 
 
• An active participant (“AP)47 is responsible for the 
development, improvement (or enhancement), 
operation, or promotion of the network, particularly if 
purchasers of the digital asset expect an AP to be 
performing or overseeing tasks that are necessary for 
the network or digital asset to achieve or retain its 
intended purpose or functionality. 
• There are essential tasks or responsibilities 
performed and expected to be performed by an AP, 
rather than an unaffiliated, dispersed community of 
network users (commonly known as a "decentralized" 
network). 
• The digital asset gives the holder rights to share in 
the enterprise's income or profits or to realize gain 
from capital appreciation of the digital asset. 
• The digital asset is transferable or traded on or 
through a secondary market or platform, or is 
expected to be in the future. 
• There is little apparent correlation between the 
purchase/offering price of the digital asset and the 
market price of the particular goods or services that 
can be acquired in exchange for the digital asset.48 
 
The above is not an exhaustive retelling of the 




47 The Framework defines this as “a promoter, sponsor, or other third 
party (or affiliated group of third parties).” Id. 
48 Id. 
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of all things considered. But this should give a sense of the 
flexible standard reflected in the Framework. 
Beyond the speech and the Framework, federal courts have 
opined on whether digital assets are securities. One federal 
district court, for instance, found no reason why Howey cannot 
be applied to digital assets and said that this was a factual 
question.49 
The three most significant SEC actions thus far are the so-
called “DAO Report”, an early cease-and-desist order against 
a company called Munchee, and a no-action letter issued 
following the release of the Framework to TurnKey Jet, Inc. 
(“TKJ”).50 The Decentralized Autonomous Organization 
(“DAO”) Report, discussed in greater detail below, declared 
the sale of shares in a company run by computer code a 
security offering, even though there were no employees or 
human issuers of the security other than the code that created 
the autonomous corporation.51 
The Munchee order, relying on the DAO Report, found that 
the company’s selling of digital tokens to help fund a food 
 
49 United States v. Zaslavskiy, No. 17 CR 647, 2018 WL 4346339, at *5 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2018) (“For present purposes, we conclude that 
[REcoins] are [investment contracts]. However, the ultimate fact-finder will 
be required to conduct an independent Howey analysis based on the 
evidence presented at trial.”) (citation omitted). 
50 Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 81207 
(Jul. 25, 2017) [hereinafter The DAO Report], https://www.sec.gov/ 
litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5M7-ZXV8]; 
Munchee Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10445 (Dec. 11, 2017) [hereinafter 
Munchee Order], https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/ 
33-10445.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4JY-RD2Q]; TurnKey Jet, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter (Apr. 3, 2019) [hereinafter TurnKey Jet No-Action Letter], 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2019/turnkey-jet-040219-
2a1.htm [https://perma.cc/8SZ4-MWWH]. There have also been a number 
of other enforcement actions. See e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges 
ICO Superstore and Owners with Operating as Unregistered Broker-
Dealers (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-185 
[https://perma.cc/395P-37KR] (detailing the first action against an 
unregistered broker dealer). 
51 See The DAO Report, supra note 50; see also infra Part IV.A.1.iii. 
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review app was an unregistered security offering.52 This was 
in spite of the fact that users would be paid in “MUN token[s]” 
for writing food reviews and that there was an ecosystem 
promised that would allow individuals to spend their MUN 
tokens, potentially even at restaurants.53 The SEC’s 
reasoning focused on (i) the reasonable expectation of profits 
by purchasers and (ii) the entrepreneurial and managerial 
efforts of Munchee.54 For purposes below, the following 
observation is important: “At the time of the offering and sale 
of MUN tokens, no other person could make changes to the 
Munchee App or was working to create an ‘ecosystem’ to 
create demand for MUN tokens.”55 
Finally, on the same day the Framework was released, the 
SEC issued a no-action letter to TKJ.56 The letter says that 
the company’s tokens as presented to the SEC are not 
securities and therefore are exempt from registration under 
the Securities and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.57 In 
making this determination the SEC relied on a number of 
factors including:  
 
• TKJ will not use any funds from Token sales to 
develop the TKJ Platform, Network, or App, and each 
of these will be fully developed and operational at the 
time any Tokens are sold; 
• The Tokens will be immediately usable for their 
intended functionality (purchasing air charter 
services) at the time they are sold; 
• TKJ will restrict transfers of Tokens to TKJ Wallets 
only, and not to wallets external to the Platform; 
• TKJ will sell Tokens at a price of one USD per Token 
throughout the life of the Program, and each Token 
will represent a TKJ obligation to supply air charter 
 
52 Munchee Order, supra note 50, at 9–10. 
53 See id. at 7. 
54 See id. at 5–7. 
55 Id. at 9. 
56 TurnKey Jet No-Action Letter, supra note 50. 
57 Id. 
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services at a value of one USD per Token; 
• If TKJ offers to repurchase Tokens, it will only do so 
at a discount to the face value of the Tokens (one USD 
per Token) that the holder seeks to resell to TKJ, 
unless a court within the United States orders TKJ to 
liquidate the Tokens; and 
• The Token is marketed in a manner that emphasizes 
the functionality of the Token, and not the potential 
for the increase in the market value of the Token.58 
 
As will be shown below, the tests proposed by this Article 
would reach the same conclusion in a more straightforward 
manner. 
IV. HOWEY FOR DIGITAL ASSETS 
In applying the Howey test to digital assets, this Article 
sets forth a decision tree that will be helpful for determining 
whether a particular digital asset is an “investment contract” 
under Howey. When an instrument is presented and alleged 
to be a security, a court asks if the four Howey factors are met. 
This Article deals with two of those factors and proposes an 
operational test for helping a court answer whether the 
factors have been met. These tests are part of the Howey 
decision tree. 
This Article assumes that there has been a payment of 
value in a collective venture. In most cases of digital asset 
purchases, this is the case; thus, the first two prongs of the 
test under Howey—an investment of money in a common 
enterprise—are presumed satisfied. 
The first step of the decision tree is to determine whether 
the asset is “sufficiently decentralized”59 such that it does not 
satisfy the “efforts of others” prong of the Howey test. This 
standard was set forth by SEC Director William Hinman in 
the June 2018 speech discussed above.60  
 
58 Id. 
59 Hinman Speech, supra note 39. 
60 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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Thus, if the purchasers never expected a person or group to 
carry out such efforts, then the assets are “sufficiently 
decentralized” and may not represent an investment contract. 
Below we propose what we call the “Bahamas Test” for 
determining sufficient decentralization. 
 
Figure 1: A Decision Tree for Digital Assets 
 
The second step of the decision tree applies if the asset is 
not sufficiently decentralized. This step determines whether 
the investment is made with an expectation of profit. If it is 
not made with expectation of profit, then the asset is not a 
security. To make this determination, we consider a 
“Substantial Steps Test.” This test has its benefits, but 
because of the inherent problems in determining an 
expectation of profit, we are willing to entertain a full 
rethinking of Howey as opposed to the imprecise fit attempted 
here. 
Generally, the first step asks a more straightforward 
question than the second. Expectation of profit will 
necessarily involve casuistic determinations of borderline 
cases.  
A. Efforts of Others Prong – the “Bahamas Test” 
The first step toward determining whether a digital asset 
is a security is determining whether it is sufficiently 
decentralized such that there is no “other” to satisfy the “. . . 
with profits to come solely from the efforts of others . . .” prong 
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of the Howey test.61 To operationally answer this question, 
this Article proposes a “Bahamas Test.” At a high level, the 
test holds that if the instrument is a decentralized one that is 
not controlled by a single entity, then it is not a security. This 
comports with the truism that, for an investment contract to 
exist, there must be a contract of some sort, whether implicit 
or explicit. If there is no other party to the contract or any 
expectation of performance, then there is no contract. The 
Bahamas Test asks: 
If there is a minting and selling of an instrument, as 
opposed to open mining of it, is there either an explicit 
or implicit contract to build and manage software such 
that if there were a breach of that contract, the project 
would fail? If there is no such sale or if there is no such 
obligation, then the “efforts of others” prong of the test 
is not satisfied and the instrument is not a security. 
Said differently: if the sellers fled to the Bahamas or ceased 
to show up to work—like Satoshi Nakamoto—would the 
project still be capable of existing?62 If the answer is “yes,” 
then the risk of fraud is sufficiently reduced such that the 
instrument is not a security. 
The Bahamas Test comports with lower courts’ 
jurisprudence regarding the “efforts of others” prong of the 
Howey test. A literal reading of Howey’s stipulation that the 
expectation of profit must come “solely through the efforts of 
the promoter or of someone other than themselves,”63 would 
suggest that any minor participation by the purchaser could 
render the asset not a security. Instead, lower courts have 
interpreted the language more broadly. For instance, in a 
widely-adopted explication, the Ninth Circuit articulated the 
standard as “whether the efforts made by those other than the 
investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential 
 
61 SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). 
62 See infra Section IV.A.1.i (discussing the background of Satoshi 
Nakamoto). 
63 Howey, 328 U.S. at 298 (emphasis added). 
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managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the 
enterprise.”64 
If read too literally, this text conflicts with both common 
sense and Hinman’s articulation that sufficiently 
decentralized assets are not securities. So long as there are 
significant efforts made by others, for example, individuals 
other than the investor who coded the protocol, then every 
non-autarkic network would satisfy the “efforts of others” 
prong.65  
A more natural reading, however, would be to focus on the 
concept of managerial efforts. Indeed, the Supreme Court in 
United Housing Foundation v. Forman stated that the efforts 
must be “entrepreneurial or managerial.”66  “Managerial” 
implies a kind of special position, either as a fiduciary or 
simply one with additional privileges, responsibilities, and 
abilities. In a sufficiently decentralized network, none of those 
managerial or entrepreneurial efforts are present because 
there are no managers or entrepreneurs.67 There are simply 
co-equals exerting effort, but none under a requirement to do 
 
64 SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 
1973). 
65 For instance, the open source Bitcoin network has over 600 
contributors who have written code for the software. See Bitcoin Core 
Integration/Staging Tree, GITHUB, https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin 
[https://perma.cc/EG58-N8BF]. These contributors are by no means united 
in any coherent manner. The vast majority of them have no connection to 
Satoshi Nakamoto and probably would not recognize each other while 
walking down the street. 
66 United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975). 
67 Entrepreneur is a term of art. According to economist Ludwig von 
Mises, it implies acting in the face of uncertainty to allocate resources in 
more productive manners. 1 LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE 
ON ECONOMICS 290–91 (Bettina Bien Greaves ed., 4th ed. 2007). The 
entrepreneur is not the capitalist, but instead has some kind of contractual 
arrangement with the capitalist who is risking her capital. In a sufficiently 
decentralized network where there are no implied or explicit contracts, 
those risking their money do not give it to entrepreneurs or managers with 
an expectation of performance. 
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so, and with the success of the enterprise not hinging on any 
one individual.68 
There are two further issues to explain with respect to the 
“efforts of others” prong—the difference between minting and 
mining and the issue of contractual privity. First, there should 
be a fundamental difference between how the securities laws 
view minting and mining. When a token is minted, the minter 
is in a special position compared with the purchaser. He has 
the unilateral ability to change the economic nature of the 
asset. This could include changing the supply or some other 
characteristic of the asset. On the other hand, when a token 
is openly mined, then there is no technical distinction between 
promoter and participator as both are on even footing.69 They 
are interacting with code that can only be changed through 
consensus.70 If the investor is in the exact same position as 
the promoter, then the stated information asymmetry 
rationale falls away.71 
 
68 It could be said that decentralization of ownership of the asset is 
enough to establish decentralization. This is incorrect because most publicly 
traded companies have ownership that is decentralized throughout the 
public. Indeed, that is one of the points of public market capital formation. 
Instead, in determining decentralization, one should look towards the 
centralization of the organizational entity. 
69 This is not to say that minted digital assets are categorically “bad” 
and mined digital assets are categorically “good.” There can certainly be bad 
actors that establish a mined digital asset to make a quick buck and there 
can certainly be good actors who mint digital assets, creating a healthy and 
vibrant community. What is relevant, however, is the reach of the securities 
laws. A diamond miner who sells fake diamonds is not selling securities 
simply because he is defrauding purchasers who may be investing money 
with an expectation of profit. 
70 Viz. consensus is the mechanism for making changes to the 
characteristics of the token, not unilateral action. Satoshi could have 
unilaterally changed the supply to forty-two million by pushing to the 
Github, but people could choose not to run this version of the code. This is 
different from a situation where individuals own tokens and more are 
minted in a closed-source environment without a choice not to run the code. 
Although ERC-20 is not closed source—anyone could create another version 
of a token with less supply—but the promoter can say that that token can 
no longer interact with her infrastructure. 
71 Pre-mining rights at first blush may appear to pose a wrinkle to this 
articulation. In such a situation, there is open mining of the asset, but ab 
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That is why this Article proposes two distinct conclusions. 
First, assets that are mined in an open process where anyone 
can participate should be considered prima facie sufficiently 
decentralized. In such a case, there is an exchange not of 
money, but of computing resources for the digital asset. This 
fails the first element of the Howey test—that there must be 
an investment of money.72 Presales, ICOs, and their ilk, on 
the other hand, should presumptively fail the “efforts of 
others” prong of the test because there is an exchange of 
money not for an asset, but for a promise to create an asset or 
network that will make such an asset valuable.73 This has 
analogues in extant case law.74 
 
initio the protocol included already-allocated coins that were reserved by 
the promoter for the ownership of pre-mine purchasers. On the one hand, a 
privileged group is going to have certain rights that others do not have, 
which would abut the open source nature of mining. This would be covered 
by the first part of the Bahamas Test, requiring open mining. On the other 
hand, if the privileges are openly known then that would qualify as open, or 
at least transparent, mining. It is unlikely that the SEC would view this as 
anything other than a workaround to the securities laws, and thus the 
Bahamas Test would not likely allow the sale of pre-mining rights to fall 
outside of the SEC’s jurisdiction. 
72 See, e.g., SEC v. Blockvest, LLC, No 18-CV-2287, 2019 WL 625163, 
at *7 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2019) (finding that a company’s offer to exchange 
its own tokens for potential investors’ digital currencies satisfied the first 
prong of the Howey test). 
73 See COINBASE, A SECURITIES LAW FRAMEWORK FOR BLOCKCHAIN 
TOKENS 16 (2016), https://www.coinbase.com/legal/securities-law-
framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/HN7C-BN3V] (“This may similarly apply 
in the case of a presale made prior to the launch of the system. For example, 
one court has found that a purchase agreement that was entered into prior 
to the construction of a resort community demonstrated a common 
enterprise. This was in part because the construction company was pooling 
presale purchase commitments in order to obtain financing to fund the 
project, and thus the completion of the project was dependent on generating 
sufficient investor interest.”); see also Wooldridge Homes, Inc. v. Bronze 
Tree, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Colo. 1983). 
74 See Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811 (1961); All 
Seasons Resorts, Inc. v. Abrams, 68 N.Y.2d 81 (1986); see also VAN 
VALKENBURGH, supra note 28, at 49 (“The information asymmetries 
inherent in a token pre-sale agreement are by-necessity more pronounced 
than a sale of a token powered by a running decentralized network.”). 
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The second issue is that of privity and disclaiming liability. 
Many ICOs include warranty disclaimers or promises to 
actually build the project to completion. However, this kind of 
disclaimer cannot be the final word when a court or regulator 
determines whether there is an explicit or implicit promise to 
build. That is because implicit promises exist even if they are 
disclaimed; it is a settled principle of law that disclaimers are 
not the final word on whether liability exists.75 Suppose for 
instance that the promoters of a project called Colacoin76 
promote that their coins will be used to interact with Colacoin 
vending machines. Were the promoters to abscond before 
creating any such machines—even though they might attempt 
to disclaim any responsibility with respect to actually building 
and stocking the vending machines—a court would quickly 
look past such disclaimer. Looking past this would not be 
based on a subjective expectation of the purchaser of the 
security, but rather on the objective actions of the seller in 
marketing the coin. The central point of this inquiry into the 
seller’s objective actions is whether there was a product or 
service implied in marketing the coin that would necessarily 
require actions of the promoter to complete. 
One key factor in the above analysis is whether there are 
technical barriers to entry to participation in the project-
network. The SEC weighed the existence of such barriers in 
the Munchee order above when they found it relevant that “no 
other person could make changes to the Munchee App[.]”77 If 
there are no technical barriers, however, and anyone can 
make changes to the project-application or network, then 
there is much less of a reason to think the instrument is 
centralized. 
There can be both formal and economic barriers to entry in 
any market.78 A formal barrier to entry would be ex ante 
 
75 For example, a defendant manufacturer cannot disclaim product 
liability, and a merchant cannot simply disclaim implied warranty of 
merchantability. 
76 See Cohsey et al., supra note 29, at 10–11. 
77 Munchee Order, supra note 50, at 9.  
78 See generally JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR 
CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1956). 
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regulation or grants of exclusivity by the government. An 
economic barrier to entry, on the other hand, is something like 
imposing high upfront capital requirements in an industry 
with economies of scale, which makes it costlier for a 
newcomer to enter the market. Economic barriers can be 
efficient barriers but are not by any means necessarily 
pernicious or welfare-decreasing. The formal definition of 
barriers, however, is the one that the SEC adopted in 
Munchee—it referred to investors’ reliance on the promoters’ 
stated ability to create an ecosystem that only the company 
itself would be able to create.79 Others were not allowed to run 
the Munchee software or contribute to the project.  
This is not the case with the decentralized Bitcoin network, 
where there are no formal barriers to entry, but solely 
economic ones.  Even though mining bitcoin today is a much 
more expensive proposition than it was when it was still 
possible to do on central processing units (CPUs), there are 
still no formal barriers to mining, nor other formal barriers to 
enter the network.80 The promoter is not in any privileged 
position relative to investors, except perhaps that she has 
earlier knowledge of the project and thus could have mined 
without others having heard about it.81 This contrast between 
the accessibility of Munchee and Bitcoin illustrates a central 
point: Formal barriers to entry are what authorities should 
look at when evaluating sufficient decentralization. 
 
79 Munchee Order, supra note 50, at 8–9. 
80 Cade Metz, Why A.I. and Cryptocurrency Are Making One Type of 
Computer Chip Scarce, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2018/05/08/technology/gpu-chip-shortage.html [https://perma.cc/VY 
R9-YQPT].  
81 If the promoter tries to hide her intentions and mine such that it 
becomes functionally the same as minting, this case seems like a concert 
promoter who does not tell anyone who the concert is so that she can buy 
the tickets ahead of time. However, if the network is open, then the future 
participants would have knowledge of the activity before their buy-in. To 
analogize to the concert promoter—there would be a ledger showing that 
tickets were already owned by the promoter herself. The decision to then 
participate is on the purchaser and the fact that an individual owns a high 
proportion of the outstanding issue is something that the participant can 
weigh. 
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A counterargument is that economic barriers to entry can 
be as powerful as formal ones, and should also factor into the 
decentralization analysis. This suggests a more expansive 
definition of monopoly and centralization than the formal 
barriers definition. Such arguments are premised on a weak 
conception of voluntariness—the thought being that an 
individual no more “chooses” to use a popular social network 
like Facebook than she chooses to eat every day. Similarly, the 
critic would say that participation in the most popular 
cryptocurrency network at the time, like Bitcoin, is not 
voluntary because economic and social pressures have made 
it the dominant, unavoidable, player. 
The response first is that the history of American 
business—and especially the history of the software industry 
with its low barriers to entry—has shown that so long as free 
entry is possible, there is rarely an entity that maintains its 
dominance for long, particularly if it is harming the market or 
behaving badly more generally.82 In other words, robust 
market forces provide a powerful check on supposed 
centralized monopolies. If, for instance, Satoshi Nakamoto 
were to have suggested new code early on that would have 
increased his share of bitcoins, it is hard to imagine the 
community approving. There are examples where miners and 
others have resisted forks even though influential groups 
supported them.83 This behavior is akin to the market’s 
reaction to an industry leader’s misstep. Economic barriers to 
entry can be efficient if they are the result of natural benefits 
of bigness, such as economies of scale or network effects. These 
 
82 See, e.g., Jeffrey Dorfman, What Antitrust Should Look Like in a 




83 See Nathaniel Popper, Some Bitcoin Backers Are Defecting to Create 
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effects are not enough to overcome either corporate sins of 
commission84 or omission.85 
A second response to this critique of the definition of 
centralization is that viewing consent in terms of legal and 
technical terms is a clearer line that better comports with 
society’s general notions of consent. Individuals may think 
using Facebook is not a free choice because they are forced 
into doing it as a result of the network effects (i.e. “all my 
friends are using it”), but legally speaking, this is at worst 
damnum absque injuria—a loss without a legally cognizable 
injury. Too broad a definition of involuntary action could lead 
to a legal regime where every contract and agreement is open 
to rescission, injecting uncertainty and chaos into society.  
One potential objection to this test is that the binary 
nature of this Bahamas inquiry is inferior to evaluating a 
promoter shirking his managerial activity on a sliding scale. 
For instance, a sliding scale would treat differently a promoter 
who flees when there is a ninety percent chance of the project’s 
success than one who flees when there is a ten percent chance 
of success. In the latter, the intuition would be that the 
promoter does not “deserve” a big chunk of the investment if 
he dramatically reduces the probability of the project’s 
success. 
The trouble with this argument is that it fails to appreciate 
the fundamental difference between open source projects and 
traditional companies. The nature of open source software 
projects is that there is no inherent ownership over the 
codebase, and it is one of the norms of the open source 
software community that there is a decentralized ownership 
 
84 Joe Nocera, Opinion, The Inside History of the ‘New Coke’ Debacle, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/ 
2017-11-03/the-inside-history-of-the-new-coke-debacle (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review). 
85 JLuo, The Rise and Fall (and Rise Again?) of BlackBerry, HARV. BUS. 
SCH. (Feb. 1, 2018), https://digit.hbs.org/submission/the-rise-and-fall-and-
rise-again-of-blackberry/ [https://perma.cc/D3E6-ZWJX]. 
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structure.86 In a traditional company, there are both duties of 
care and loyalty that are legally cognizable; no similar norms 
or duties are legally, or even morally, assumed in the very 
libertarian ethos of open source projects.87 The Bahamas Test 
is therefore well-tailored to the realities of open source digital 
assets because it incorporates a workable definition of consent 
and emphasizes only technical barriers to entry. 
1. Applying the Bahamas Test  
This Section considers the decentralized status of three 
networks under the Bahamas Test: Bitcoin,88 Ethereum,89 
 
86 Certain aspects of an open source project may be closed source. If it 
is possible to sever those aspects from the project itself, then they should be 
analyzed under a different rubric than the open source parts. 
87 But see Angela Walch, In Code(rs) We Trust: Software Developers as 
Fiduciaries in Public Blockchains, in THE BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION: LEGAL 
& POLICY CHALLENGES (Georgios Dimitropoulos et al. eds.) (forthcoming 
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3203198 
[https://perma.cc/84UF-Z9FL]. Walch argues that a fiduciary duty can exist 
in open source projects. Id. at 3. One of the criteria she uses to determine if 
there is a fiduciary duty is whether there is an entrustment of either 
property or power. See id. at 10. She claims that a duty exists in certain 
open source projects because certain core developers can have significant 
power and control over the property of the network. Id. at 3. The trouble 
with this argument is that mere exercise of power does not create a 
fiduciary. It is the entrustment of that power. For example, individuals who 
agreed to participate in an open source project or the network it forms did 
not have any powers they entrusted to the network. They chose to 
participate, which gave the developers power by virtue of their 
participation. This is no different from attending a speech—the speaker has 
not been granted a fiduciary duty simply because he is more powerful 
because he has a platform. In other words, the power is created by the 
network participant—neither it nor property is entrusted to the developers. 
88 For a general background of Bitcoin, see Max I Raskin, Realm of the 
Coin: Bitcoin and Civil Procedure, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L., 969, 971–
72 (2015). 
89 For a general background of Ethereum, see Bernard Marr, 
Blockchain: A Very Short History of Ethereum Everyone Should Read, 
FORBES (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/ 
2018/02/02/blockchain-a-very-short-history-of-ethereum-everyone-should-
read/#549791d01e89 [https://perma.cc/3DUN-Z2DA].  
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and The DAO.90 This is to show that the test works not only 
prospectively but retrospectively—it ensures that the test is 
not simply our normative view of what the law should be, but 
what the law is. 
i. Bitcoin 
The Bitcoin project was originally created by a person or 
group called Satoshi Nakamoto. Nakamoto wrote a white 
paper in which he91 presented the idea of the Bitcoin network 
and then worked with a group of new individuals to release 
the first version of the software.92 The Bitcoin White Paper 
(the “White Paper”) made no investment claims, nor did 
Nakamoto make any promises regarding seeing the project to 
fruition.93 This closely adheres to how open source 
communities work. In fact, only a few years after launching 
the Bitcoin network, Nakamoto disappeared and no longer 
wrote code for the project or contributed in any meaningful 
way. He still retained the huge amount of bitcoin that he 
initially mined, having an estimated 980,000 bitcoin.94 Yet the 
 
90 For a general background of The DAO, see Nathaniel Popper, A 
Hacking of More Than $50 Million Dashes Hopes in the World of Virtual 
Currency, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/ 
business/dealbook/hacker-may-have-removed-more-than-50-million-from-
experimental-cybercurrency-project.html [https://perma.cc/J2J6-V3HK]. A 
corollary to the Bahamas Test is a Capitalization Test—if the first letter of 
the network is capitalized, then it is not sufficiently decentralized. 
91 Some will object to using “he” as the personal pronoun for Nakamoto 
when it is not known if Nakamoto is a male, let alone an individual. This 
article uses “he” for brevity’s sake, fully aware that this footnote defeats this 
purpose. 
92 See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash 
System, BITCOIN.ORG, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/N55D-
LTXA]. 
93 Even if the White Paper did make investment claims, it is unlikely 
that bitcoin would be classified as a security any more than baseball cards 
are classified as a security even though they can be sold by dealers 
promising an increase in value. This is precisely because there is no 
satisfaction of the “others” prong of Howey. 
94 See Evelyn Cheng, There Are Now 17 Million Bitcoins in Existence – 
Only 4 Million Left to ‘Mine,’ CNBC (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
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SEC, as heard through Hinman, believes bitcoin is not a 
security.95 This determination did not hinge on the effort 
Nakamoto contributed. Had Nakamoto left the project a 
month or even a year earlier, he could do so because he was 
under no obligation; he made no promises—implicit or 
explicit—to those involved with the project. The real analysis 
was whether he was an “other” at all.96 He clearly was not. 
The law ought to encourage innovators in the open source field 
to create decentralized projects and not calculate the exact 
time they can jump ship—at least in these kinds of projects, it 
is better that the ship has no captain. 
This is an easy case. As Director Hinman said in his 
speech, “when I look at Bitcoin today, I do not see a central 
third party whose efforts are a key determining factor in the 
enterprise.”97 Thus, bitcoin appears sufficiently decentralized 
to pass the Bahamas Test and should not be regulated as a 
security under Howey. 
ii. Ethereum 
The Ethereum Network is a more difficult case. Vitalik 
Buterin conceived and promoted the network, and Buterin 
held a presale and made promises to build software.98 In 
Buterin’s words, “You are trusting us to take the bitcoin and 
 
2018/04/26/there-are-now-17-million-bitcoins-in-existence--only-4-million-
left-to-mine.html [https://perma.cc/XN49-CW72]. Given the considerable 
volatility in bitcoin price, we leave it to the reader to calculate the current 
value in U.S. dollars. See Bitcoin Price (BTC), COINDESK, https://www.coin 
desk.com/price/bitcoin (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
95 See generally Hinman Speech, supra note 39. 
96 There is also an issue of whether there was a sale directly from 
Nakamoto—this, however, is a proxy for determining whether there was 
any promise made. The existence of consideration is a good indication that 
there was something exchanged on the other side. In the case of a presale, 
as opposed to mining, this promise is often to build or maintain a network. 
97 Hinman Speech, supra note 39. 
98 Victoria van Eyk, Ethereum Launches Own ‘Ether’ Coin, with 
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use it to develop Ethereum.”99 If, following the presale, 
Buterin and his team had absconded to the Bahamas, his 
proposed project almost certainly would have collapsed.  Thus, 
Ether would fail the Bahamas Test. This alone, however, does 
not mean that Ether is a security. There is still the second step 
of the test.100 
Furthermore, as Director Hinman pointed out, an asset 
that was once issued as a security—and even an unregistered 
security—can later lose its security characteristics.101 Peter 
Van Valkenburgh gives a particularly useful analogy: 
[T]ake the facts of the Howey case itself, and make a 
small change. As before, Mr. Howey convinces people 
to give him money for land in Florida; he says they 
own the land and he says he’ll maintain the orange 
trees that grow on the land. But, instead of promising 
to pay investors profits from selling the oranges at 
market, he promises to give them the oranges. This 
fact does not change the outcome in Howey—the [sic] 
court would still have found that investment contracts 
for an orange grove in Florida had been sold—but, of 
course, the oranges themselves would never have been 
found to be securities. If one of the resultant oranges 
ends up in a grocery store, you don’t need a broker 
dealer to buy it for you. People know this intuitively 
with oranges and other scarce physical things (of 
course this inert object I hold in my hand isn’t a 
security—it’s just a thing), but many haven’t yet 
internalized that scarce digital things now exist and 
the same reasoning applies.102 
On the other end of the spectrum is an ICO like REcoin, for 
which the issuers made specific promises about backing 
tokens with real estate.103 This is a contractual statement, 
 
99 Id. 
100 See infra Section IV.B (discussing the “expectation of profit” 
analysis of Ethereum, which concludes Ether could pass the Substantial 
Steps Test). 
101 Hinman Speech, supra note 39. 
102 VAN VALKENBURGH, supra note 28, at 61. 
103 Cali Haan, RECoin and Diamond Reserve Coin ICO Issuer Pleads 
Guilty to Fraud, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Nov. 16, 2018), 
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and were the promoters to flee, the project would cease to exist 
because it would not fulfill its primary claim of economic 
value. REcoin would thus fail the Bahamas Test because it is 
not decentralized. This easy case provides a meaningful 
contrast to Ether’s more ambiguous status. 
iii. The DAO 
An even more difficult case than Ether is The DAO. The 
DAO was meant to operate as an investment fund, in which 
investors would fund an entity that would later make 
distributions to fund business ventures.104 The DAO would 
not be like other venture capital funds in a key way—there 
would be no general partner making decisions on behalf of the 
limited partners. Instead, using an open-source code, 
members of the Ethereum community would use a coding 
framework—Slock.it—to build a smart contract on the 
Ethereum blockchain. The smart contract would be self-
executing, meaning once it was built and deployed, the smart 
contract would make investment-funding decisions. Anyone 
with a project could pitch an idea to The DAO community—
which raised 12.7 million Ether (valued at about $150 million 
at that time). Individuals with tokens could vote on the plan, 
and if the projects were profitable, they would receive 
distributions. 
Things fell apart.105 A hacker found a weakness in the 





104 Christoph Jentzsch, Decentralized Autonomous Organization to 
Automate Governance Final Draft – Under Review (unpublished 
manuscript), https://download.slock.it/public/DAO/WhitePaper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YNS3-Q23G]. 
105 See Osman Gazi Güçlütürk, The DAO Hack Explained: Unfortunate 
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third of the fund.106 The hacker was not the person who set up 
The DAO, since no single individual set up The DAO. Instead, 
the hacker simply observed the weakness—which had to do 
with the timing of how the smart contracts and token balances 
were updated—and exploited it.  
At first blush, it would seem The DAO was sufficiently 
decentralized. The founders of the project could have left the 
project, and it would not fail because others could and did 
participate in the network.107 Furthermore, Slock.it had 
denied implicit or explicit obligations to those participating in 
the project. Thus, under the Bahamas Test, The DAO would 
appear to not satisfy the definition of an investment contract, 
and could not be regulated as a security. 
The SEC, however, disagreed.108 It declared The DAO was, 
in fact, offering unregistered securities.109 The SEC focused 
on the “Curators”—a group of individuals chosen by Slock.it 
to manage aspects of The DAO.110 Though the SEC decided 
not to pursue any enforcement action,111 the pronouncement 
still stands. The answer to reconcile this outcome with the 
Bahamas Test, however, is that our initial intuition from the 
Bahamas Test was wrong and that The DAO was not 
sufficiently decentralized. 
There are two reasons for this. The first is the simple 
explanation that the Curators had specific responsibilities 
and obligations to the DAO project. Most importantly, they 
whitelisted Ethereum addresses that could receive Ether from 
 
106 See Matthew Leising, The Ether Thief, BLOOMBERG (June 13, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2017-the-ether-thief/ (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review). 
107 See Michael del Castillo, The DAO: Or How a Leaderless Ethereum 
Project Raised $50 Million, COINDESK (May 12, 2016), https://www.coin 
desk.com/the-dao-just-raised-50-million-but-what-is-it [https://perma. 
cc/26DG-DRCN]. 
108 See The DAO Report, supra note 50. 
109 Id. at 11–16. 
110 Id. at 7. 
111 Id. at 1. 
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The DAO. This certainly fails the Bahamas Test, and 
therefore, The DAO was not sufficiently decentralized.112 
Had there been no Curators, the case would be closer, so it 
is worth discussing the second reason the initial intuition is 
wrong: a conflation of decentralized networks and 
decentralized corporations. Decentralized networks generally 
do not make promises to their participants other than to abide 
by certain protocols.113 They do not use computer code to place 
obligations on third parties to manage the effort. A 
decentralized corporation, on the other hand, can still make 
promises to investors—and in the case of The DAO, did make 
promises to investors. The promises were not about 
performance, but about distributions. The DAO codified these 
promises, albeit in smart contracts. The DAO entity itself was 
the offeror of the security and the SEC’s reasoning was that 
those behind The DAO were the coders and the Curators. 
Contrast this with Bitcoin, where there was no promise made 
to a certain share of profits or any obligation on any third 
party. 
An additional reason for finding insufficient 
decentralization is that the Curators of The DAO had special 
rights and powers that average users did not have.114 This 
was baked into the code and created obligations. For instance, 
they had the power to change the governance of the DAO such 
that they could lower the threshold for voting on proposals.115  
This is a special power that can be characterized as a privilege 
or contractual arrangement. This whitelisting of proposals 
fails the Bahamas Test because if the users were to walk 
away, they would be in breach. 
 
112 For purposes of argument, this Article accepts the Howey 
framework of the expectation of profit and assumes that this was present in 
this case. 
113 Were a decentralized network to encode certain promises to 
investors that put obligations on others, this would change the analysis. 
Admittedly, the line between promises to investors and encoded protocols is 
blurry. 
114 See id. at 7–8. 
115 Id. at 8. 
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The SEC’s reasoning, however, muddies the waters by 
focusing on users’ reliance on Slock.it, instead of their reliance 
on The DAO. The SEC in its opinion stated, “The DAO’s 
investors relied on the managerial and entrepreneurial efforts 
of Slock.it and its co-founders, and The DAO’s Curators, to 
manage The DAO and put forth project proposals that could 
generate profits for The DAO’s investors.”116 The SEC then 
goes on to list a number of technical ways in which investors 
relied on Slock.it.117 This is unnecessary because the smart 
contracts that encoded the DAO made certain promises. That 
itself is enough to fail the Bahamas Test because if the 
decentralized DAO was to abscond, the project would 
necessarily fail. 
Imagine, for a moment, that Apple’s board of directors and 
managers were replaced by computer code. This computer 
could either execute the wishes of decentralized shareholders 
or be artificially intelligent and autonomous, but otherwise 
behaved and invested like any other board. Now suppose the 
computer code was “hacked”118 and money was transferred 
from Apple’s coffers to the hacker. Whether this “hack” is 
fraud or a clever use of code does not change the fact that the 
decentralized shareholders still hold, albeit now less valuable, 
securities. This is because there were promises, either implicit 
or explicit, that the offeror (Apple) was going to do something 
for the purchaser. Whether it was a computer or group of 
humans who were doing the promising, there was still a 
promise. In this case, the promises were not explicit, but 
rather implicit because the purchaser of DAO tokens had an 
expectation. That being said, there is an intractable problem 
of who is making the promises, and by extension, who is 
selling those securities. 
Slock.it was promoting here—it is not that they were 
involved with the DAO. The question for the SEC was whether 
they were involved in the promotion of selling the securities, 
 
116 Id. at 12. 
117 Id. at 12–13. 
118 This is a loaded term in The DAO context because the “hack” 
involved someone taking advantage of a loophole but not stealing any 
information—such as a password—to gain unauthorized access. 
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made the promises to the purchasers, and were expected by 
the purchasers to promote and manage the venture. An 
individual who owns no equity in a company can still be liable 
for selling securities—the Howey test looks at the instrument 
itself.119 That the SEC did not bring any kind of case against 
Slock.it is telling. This was clearly more of an example of 
experimentation than investment defrauding. The “bad actor” 
here was not anyone related to The DAO, but rather a 
hacker.120 The SEC’s non-enforcement was the right 
outcome—The DAO hack is not a situation that the Securities 
Act was meant to cover. 
iv. Summary of the Bahamas Test 
The virtue of the Bahamas Test is that it gets at what the 
securities laws aim to prevent: individuals being taken 
advantage of based on information asymmetry.121 It does this 
in a manner that it easy to operationalize because it is not 
difficult to distinguish open from closed networks or instances 
where promises have been made from those where promises 
have not. This is a fairly simple determination and one that 
courts make regularly. 
B. Expectation of Profit Prong 
The second node of the decision tree shown in Figure 1, and 
thus the second step in our analysis, is whether the 
instrument is primarily about investment or about 
consumption—this is the “expectation of profit” prong from 
Howey. If an instrument fails the Bahamas Test, i.e., it is not 
sufficiently decentralized, and passes the expectation of profit 
 
119 See, e.g., SEC v. Chinese Consol. Benevolent Ass’n, 120 F.2d 738 (2d 
Cir. 1941) (holding intermediary in bond sales that was not even earning a 
commission sold unregistered securities in violation of securities laws by 
arranging sale). 
120 There is an open question of whether the hacker even was a bad 
actor. 
121 Whether one accepts that the state needs to play this role is beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
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prong—as evaluated under the two standards described 
below—it should be regulated as a security. 
This prong is, frankly, a more difficult one to analyze than 
the first discussed. The structure of this Section hopefully 
reflects this difficulty by posing more theoretical concerns. 
This Section begins with a recap of the current test for 
expectation of profits, and includes a discussion on the 
amount of resale in the secondary market. Then, it proposes 
the “Substantial Steps Test.”   
1. Current Test—Facts and Circumstances 
With respect to the “expectation of profit” prong of the 
Howey test in the digital asset context, there is a temptation 
to use a multi-factor test or employ a “I know it when I see it” 
analysis.122 The SEC relied on this in Munchee.123 Among 
other things, the trouble with multi-factor analyses is that 
they create legal uncertainty—their virtue is flexibility to the 
regulator. That is why this multi-factor analysis—“facts and 
circumstances”—is largely the approach chosen by the SEC in 
its enforcement actions and articulated in its Framework.124 
One of the factors that could be relevant for determining 
whether there is an expectation of profit is the ratio of 
individual buyers who consume the instrument versus resell 
the instrument—that is, the velocity of the secondary market. 
Certainly, in the vast and overwhelming number of ICOs, the 
purchasers are profit-seeking because in many instances 
there is no useable product, nor will there ever be a useable 
product.125 This latter result could be because of fraud or 
 
122 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
123 “Determining whether a transaction involves a security does not 
turn on labeling – such as characterizing an ICO as involving a ‘utility 
token’ – but instead requires an assessment of ‘the economic realities 
underlying a transaction.’” Munchee Order, supra note 50, at 9. 
124 See Framework, supra note 16 (“Whether a particular digital asset 
at the time of its offer or sale satisfies the Howey test depends on the specific 
facts and circumstances.”). 
125 See Cohsey et al., supra note 29 (noting a number of important 
features of smart contract ICOs—including scarcity, lock-in, and 
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because the business simply failed. But this factor is not 
dispositive because there are certainly instances where a low 
ratio of consumers-to-sellers does not deem an instrument an 
“investment contract.” For instance, a concert promoter may 
sell 50,000 Lady Gaga concert tickets to various dealers 
knowing that these dealers (and many of their customers) may 
turn around and resell them for a profit depending on how the 
supply and demand change over time. No one believes, and 
the SEC has never taken the position, that the intent of the 
initial buyers in such a case would turn a concert ticket into a 
security. This is in large part because it is the market as a 
whole that determines the price, not the effort of the 
individual promoters. Courts have consistently held that 
markets where supply and demand, and not the managerial 
efforts of others, determines the market price are not 
securities markets.126 
One could complicate the concert ticket case by imagining 
the concert promoter does not yet have Lady Gaga signed up 
yet but rather offers the following deal: the promoter will sell 
50,000 tickets for a venue and an act to be determined, based 
in part on how much money the promoter is able to raise 
through the sale. This is a more difficult case for reasons that 
have little to do with the expected velocity of the secondary 
market. Instead, the concern is that the promoter might 
abscond with the money or, perhaps, not exert the effort or 
expend the resources that the buyers expect. The latter 
concern—low promoter effort—seems to prove too much, since 
this is present in every exchange of money for value, whether 
it is going to the movies or eating out or buying any product. 
 
modifiability). These features are often not encoded in the actual software, 
leading them to conclude that there is something inherently fraudulent in 
the ICO market. See id. The trouble with this analysis is that it implies that 
sticking to the smart contract is what the purchasers value, where it may 
be the case that the low cost of non-SEC issuance is the real value in these 
markets. 
126 See, e.g., SEC v. Belmont Reid & Co., Inc., 794 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 
1986) (dealing with a sale of gold coins); Noa v. Key Futures, Inc., 638 F.2d 
77 (9th Cir. 1980) (involving a forward contract for silver); Sinva, Inc. v. 
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 
1966) (addressing a futures contract for sugar). 
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It might be worth less than expected. In general, one expects 
markets and general anti-fraud rules, enforced by both 
private actions and the government, to take the edge off this 
concern. The former concern—fully absconding—is 
significant, and this Article addresses it below. But it is 
doubtful that if a concert promoter offered this contract the 
SEC would intervene. 
The case of tokens can be similarly difficult. A token that 
is redeemable for a product or service might not be considered 
a security, but what if an entity bought most or all of the 
tokens with the goal of reselling them to consumers? This 
might look like a distribution, with the initial seller engaged 
in a scheme to avoid the securities laws. But, if the initial 
buyer were purchasing bananas to resell, the initial seller of 
bananas would not be engaged in a securities transaction. 
Other problems arise. When considering resales, how 
should one weigh the tokens—by number of tokens or 
individual person? Tokens are also mixed-use—unlike concert 
seats, they can be used for multiple things. How does one 
compare the utility of one individual who is consuming the 
token with the utility of another purely speculating?127 Ether 
used to power smart contracts may have tremendous value to 
a small number of individuals actually running smart 
contracts and building their applications on them—but the 
vast majority of Ether owners are likely owning for profit-
seeking reasons. The fundamental problem is that an 
investment contract for one individual may not be an 
investment contract for another, but as the SEC cannot make 
these individual determinations, it must necessarily draw a 
line, which creates imprecision. 
Other tests could be used. One might look at the intent of 
the buyer. If the buyer intends to resell, or perhaps enough 
buyers intend to resell, then the expectation of profit prong 
 
127 This challenge for utilitarian theory formed the basis of Robert 
Nozick’s “Utility Monster” thought experiment. See generally ROBERT 
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). This theory is accepted in 
contemporary analyses. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Harrison, Happiness, Efficiency, 
and the Promise of Decisional Equity: From Outcome to Process, 36 PEPP. L. 
REV. 935 (2009).   
  
No. 2:443] A REGULATORY CLASSIFICATION OF DIGITAL ASSETS 481 
might be satisfied. This raises significant line-drawing 
problems, as noted above. How many buyers motivated by 
resale would be enough to turn something into a security? But, 
more problematically, it would create significant uncertainty 
for issuers, who would have to guess as to the motivation of 
buyers, which they cannot control. This would effectively kill 
any exemption along these lines. 
It is for perhaps this reason that the SEC and courts have 
eschewed the motive of buyers, focusing instead on the intent 
of the issuer regarding what the issuer is offering, as reflected 
through the marketing of the offering. This approach is 
illustrated by the SEC’s consideration of these issues in the 
context of condominiums. After all, a real estate developer 
might build a condo building and sell the initial condos to 
individuals who intend only to resell them. One can easily see 
how the situation could look much like the concert promoter 
examples above. Another option would be for the developer to 
sell interests in condos to individuals who would continue to 
own them but had no intention to live in them, preferring to 
rent them out. A few tweaks could make this into an 
investment scheme that looked just like the facts of Howey. 
Individuals might invest money in a condo development 
motivated entirely or primarily by the money that the 
investment would generate, instead of a desire to live in the 
condo. 
The SEC addressed this problem through the issuance of 
an informal lawmaking known as a “release.” Release 5347, 
issued on January 4, 1973, set forth the conditions under 
which an investment condo would be considered a security.128 
The goal was to reduce the uncertainty for real estate 
developers and buyers and sellers of condos. The release 
provided: 
. . . condominiums, coupled with a rental 
arrangement, will be deemed to be securities if they 
 
128 Guidelines as to the Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to 
Offers and Sales of Condominiums or Units in a Real Estate Development, 
Securities Act Release No. 5347 (Jan. 4, 1973) [hereinafter “SEC Release 
No. 5347”], https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/1973/33-5347.pdf 
[perma.cc/U9M4-ZNA9]. 
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are offered and sold through advertising, sales 
literature, promotional schemes or oral 
representations which emphasize the economic 
benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the 
managerial efforts of the promoter . . . in renting the 
units.129 
This test is designed to draw a jurisdictional line, putting 
the scarce resources of the SEC to work in cases in which there 
is a greater risk of fraud or irrational behavior that might 
implicate the capital markets. By focusing on marketing 
materials, the test may risk being both under-inclusive and 
over-inclusive, but it in turn gives some certainty to buyers 
and sellers. And, at least in the condo case, it avoids the more 
complicated inquiries into buyers’ intents, the nature of the 
resale markets, and so on. 
One could imagine deploying a similar test for digital 
assets—if they are sold through materials emphasizing “the 
economic benefits to the purchaser” from reselling them, then 
they would be securities, while if they are pitched as 
opportunities for consumption of goods or services, they would 
not be. Although potentially useful, there is a problem with 
this approach. In a context in which the public has an 
expectation about ICOs that is already formulated—perhaps, 
that they are a way to get rich quick—then the marketing 
materials may not matter very much. Of course, such a 
concern might also have been true during the condo craze 
during the recent run up in housing prices before the financial 
crisis, but it was not enough to move the SEC to regulate 
condos. 
Compounding the problems of the expectations of profit 
test is the approach of the SEC. The SEC’s analysis thus far 
has not been static, which has reduced the certainty of any 
regulatory action. As the SEC has recently pointed out, Ether 
may have begun as a security—because there was an 
expectation of profit stemming from a centralized promoter—
but is now no longer a security.130 Even the advertisements 
 
129 Id. at 3. 
130 See Hinman Speech, supra note 39.   
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and presale by the Ethereum Foundation were not enough to 
counteract what the Ethereum network had become. 
Thus, any new test must incorporate the facts that: (a) an 
instrument that did carry with it an expectation of profit can 
morph into one that does not; and (b) expectation of profit with 
respect to utility is a nebulous concept, especially when 
involving multiple buyers and sellers131 of an instrument. 
2. Proposal—Substantial Steps Test 
This Article proposes a Substantial Steps Test for 
determining whether a token is purchased with an 
expectation of profit. The focus of this test is not on how the 
object of the token or coin is marketed, but on whether 
someone is actually producing it. The purpose of this shift in 
the inquiry is to reflect concerns over the fact that the 
marketing test may be under-inclusive on fraud protection in 
the current chaotic environment for digital assets. The 
possibility that the test could evolve as conditions change 
remains open. 
The Substantial Steps Test is as follows: 
Are the promoters taking good faith, substantial steps 
towards completion of a project that they believe will 
have use to some users of the token beyond resale 
value or economic income? If so, then the instrument 
is not sold with an expectation of profit and thus is not 
classified as an investment contract. 
So long as the issuer of a token is in fact engaged in a good 
faith effort to build the underlying product or service for which 
the token will be redeemable, then the token is not an 
investment, but rather purchased for consumption. This is 
true even if there is a robust secondary market for tokens. 
After all, there is a robust secondary market for condos, 
homes, cars, boats, and practically all other real and personal 
property. 
 
131 Some of the sellers may have an intent to build a network, while 
others may be snake oil salesmen. 
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Return to the concert promoter hypothetical discussed 
above.132 The Substantial Steps Test applied to the case of the 
Lady Gaga concert yields an easy answer—it is not a security 
because obtaining a venue and a performer would clearly 
constitute substantial steps. This result is in accord with how 
the SEC views the case, since concert promoters do not even 
feel the need to request a no-action letter. After all, concert 
tickets are not marketed as an investment opportunity, as 
dictated by Release 5347.133 
But what about the tougher case of the concert promoter 
without a venue or a performer who pitches the offer as a way 
of raising money to afford a top venue and performer in the 
first place? Under the marketing test, one would simply look 
to how the promoter packaged the opportunity—if it were sold 
as a way of getting in early so as to profit from the efforts of 
the promoter, then it would be a security; if it were instead 
sold as a concert lottery ticket of sorts (instead of an economic 
one), then it would not. But, as noted above in the exploration 
of the facts and circumstances test, for digital assets, this 
might not paint a full picture. Instead, the Substantial Steps 
Test asks whether the promoter is in fact taking concrete 
steps to put on a concert, or is merely trying to create a frenzy 
in which the whole game is the secondary market. 
The virtue of this test to a federal regulator is that it 
encourages the development of useful projects and it 
discourages the sale of unregulated securities that are solely 
designed to enrich the promoter and its affiliates through 
creating a secondary market. It essentially says that when a 
seller of an instrument uses those proceeds to build a product 
in some way connected to the instrument, then the seller does 
not have to register the sale. 
 Importantly, the test has a requirement of 
continuousness—as soon as the promoters cease trying to 
create an actual, functional software project, the consumers 
can no longer have a reasonable expectation of some 
 
132 See supra Section IV.B.1.   
133 See SEC Release No. 5347, supra note 128.   
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consumptive utility and any sales are likely done with an 
expectation of profit. 
The challenge of this test, beyond determining the 
subjective intent of the promoters, is that it creates the 
possibility of a non-security becoming a security. This poses 
two problems: monitoring and creating proper incentives. 
After discussing both these problems, this Article lays out a 
solution for regulators to adopt. 
On the monitoring side, the regulator must ensure that the 
promoter is compliant by continuing to take those substantial 
steps towards the creation of a useful project.134 One can 
imagine lots of ways in which ongoing compliance with these 
regulatory expectations could be measured. Regulators could 
require periodic updates, involving affidavits from promoters 
filed on a periodic basis, for example. This could be done 
whether the regulator is the government or, in a likely better 
approach, a self-regulatory body that acts as a first-line 
regulator, such as the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (FINRA). Such affidavits, under penalty of felony, 
could provide a basis for ex post enforcement, including a loss 
of membership fees and bans in the case of a self-regulatory 
organization (SRO) or civil and criminal sanctions in the case 
of the government regulator. 
On the incentives side, entrepreneurs are in a difficult 
position. Put simply, fraud is not the only reason projects fail. 
For example, an entrepreneur acting in good faith may have 
raised money through a coin offering to build a service she 
cannot complete. At some point, she will need to stop taking 
substantial steps to establish the business as a useful creation 
as it winds down. This potential ex post security label would 
disincentivize entrepreneurs from the outset. The flip side of 
this disincentive, however, is deterring the bad faith 
entrepreneur who initially takes substantial steps toward her 
 
134 It may not be the SEC itself that has jurisdiction to engage in this 
monitoring, but rather the Commodity Futures Trading Commission or 
some other entity.  
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business’s development and subsequently spends the rest of 
the business funds on Lamborghinis and alpaca socks.135 
A registration system discussed below, whether it is with 
the government or an SRO would help address this problem. 
Affidavits regarding substantial steps could be withdrawn 
based on changes in business facts. When that happens, the 
tokens would become unregistered securities, and therefore 
could not be resold without registration. Those who initially 
sold instruments that later became unregistered securities 
would not be liable under securities laws unless they sold the 
instruments after they were deemed unregistered securities. 
This solution, however, presents some problems under 
current law because a security cannot currently arise from a 
non-security in this fashion. Accordingly, if something is 
deemed to be a security, and it were sold or resold without 
registration or an exemption therefrom, it would subject the 
seller of the security to liability. Under the Substantial Steps 
Test, this would turn business risk into legal risk—any good 
faith effort to create a product or service that failed would 
subject the promoter to legal liability for selling unregistered 
securities. The market would therefore need a safe harbor for 
token issuers who would otherwise be subjected to liability 
through this quirk of adding the test to current law. 
To solve the above problems and operationalize the 
Substantial Steps Test, this Article endorses a safe harbor 
similar to one previously offered.136 The proposal is as follows: 
A developer, seller, or token exchange shall be free 
from civil and criminal liability for violations of 
securities laws if they: 
 
135 It is worth mentioning that a perfect subjective test would take care 
of this second challenge by allowing reviewers to read the mind of the 
entrepreneurs to separate the good from the bad actors. But this side of 
Eden, there are only proxies for intent. 
136 See VAN VALKENBURGH, supra note 28; see also Peter van 
Valkenburgh, Principles for Clarifying SEC Jurisdiction over 
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1. Register as a developer, seller, or token exchange 
with the SEC or approved self-regulatory 
organization, providing [name, contact information, 
and a brief description of the token related activities 
in which they intend to engage or have previously 
engaged], and 
2. Have a reasonable and good faith belief that the 
tokens they are developing, selling, or exchanging are 
not either: 
a. Tokens that represent a promise by a developer 
or seller to deliver a future open blockchain token 
if the developer or seller accepted money from 
purchasers and advertised that said future token 
will be a valuable investment; or 
b. Tokens that represent specific contracted-for 
rights to profits derived from the efforts of the 
developer or seller beyond mere appreciation of the 
token’s value if the developer or seller has accepted 
money from purchasers; and 
3. Take reasonably prompt and effective action to 
cease development, sale, or exchange of a token that is 
identified as a security by the SEC or otherwise ceases 
to meet the criteria described in (2)(a)–(b) above.137 
This lighter registration requirement goes beyond the anti-
fraud rationale by helping to bridge the information 
asymmetry between the seller and purchaser. The prospective 
purchaser would see a clear statement about the asset, given 
the ease of articulating the value of a product in a short simple 
statement. For instance, a token could allow an individual to 
watch television over the Internet or could be used to backup 
files. Such statements could also provide a basis for future 
civil or criminal actions against the seller. One possible 
concern, however, is that such a light registration 
requirement would quickly come to resemble the current 
regulatory regime in which there is a risk of too much 
regulatory discretion. Having a link to a tangible product 
mitigates this risk. 
On the front end, the Substantial Steps Test encourages 
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useful product. On the back end, the safe harbor discourages 
them from stopping because what was once not a security can 
ex post attain the status of a security.138 This is the mirror 
image of Ethereum, which was once possibly a security, but 
now is no longer. 
As a coda to this Section, the SEC’s no-action letter issued 
to TKJ confirms the validity of the Substantial Steps Test. 
Clearly the tokens issued by TKJ would fail the Bahamas Test 
as there were rights, privileges, and obligations the promoters 
had that would doom the project were they to abscond to the 
Bahamas. On the Substantial Steps Test, it is clear that the 
promoters here are taking good faith, substantial steps 
towards completion of a project that they believe will have use 
to some users of the token beyond resale value or economic 
income. Specifically, they are building and maintaining a 
platform for purchasing air charter services that has value 
beyond secondary trading of the tokens.139 Merely marketing 
a digital asset as a “utility token” does not allow a promoter to 
evade a determination that the asset is, in fact, a security. But 
in applying the Substantial Steps Test, certain utility tokens 
are certainly not securities and the SEC’s TKJ no-action letter 










138 See Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 375, 377 (2007). 
139 TurnKey Jet No-Action Letter, supra note 50. 
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3. Summary of Our Tests 





































There are two primary issues that motivate securities 
regulation: “agency costs” and “investment versus 
consumption.” The first issue goes to the possibility that 
promoters will take advantage of investors, whether this 
amounts to fraud or something short of fraud. This is the 
“other peoples’ money” problem—when anyone turns over 
money to someone else, the possibility exists that the recipient 
will abuse the trust of the investor. Economists and lawyers 
call this possibility an agency problem, and the costs 
associated with it—costs of monitoring agents, bonding by 
agents, and the inevitable wedge between interests of the 
principal and the agent—“agency costs.”140 This issue is 
addressed in the Howey test by the prong that triggers 
securities regulation in cases when agency costs may be high. 
When investors turn over their money to strangers with only 
 
140 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. 
FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
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a promise in return, securities laws will generally apply. 
When, however, investors are not held to the whim of the 
promises of other individuals, the securities laws will 
generally not apply. In such cases, the decentralization of the 
system cuts strongly against treating investments as 
securities. 
The other issue is whether the thing being purchased for 
value is for consumption purposes (as one buys a house or a 
car) or for investment purposes (as one buys a stock or bond). 
Although there are robust secondary markets for houses and 
cars, these things do not become securities, and thus subject 
to the jurisdiction of the SEC, simply because an individual 
buys one with the sole intent of reselling it quickly for a profit. 
The SEC has tried to draw the line instead based on whether 
a piece of property, like a condo, is marketed for consumption 
or rather as an alternative investment to the stock market. 
The concern is that if investment opportunities are not 
regulated, money will flow out of the stock market and into 
real estate or other markets. 
While marketing materials may be probative of whether a 
digital asset is a security, those materials alone are 
insufficient to make a determination, especially in the current 
environment for digital assets.141 Therefore, this Article 
proposes a “Substantial Steps Test.” It focuses on whether the 
digital asset is linked to an actual physical product or service, 
such as computing power, consulting services, or the like. If it 
is, then it follows that the digital asset looks more like a car 
or a house, rather than a stock or bond. To avoid the empty 
promise problem, this Article proposes that issuers of coins be 
required to register their products or services with either the 
SEC or an approved self-regulatory organization, and then 
certify on an ongoing basis that they continue to take 
substantial steps to develop the product or service. 
 
141 See Chris Brummer, Trevor I. Kiviat & Jai Massari, What Should 
Be Disclosed in an Initial Coin Offering?, in CRYPTOASSETS: LEGAL AND 
MONETARY PERSPECTIVES (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 13, 22), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3293311 [https://perma.cc/V4ZR-3VW9] 
(discussing disclosure generally). 
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If the product or service failed or started to fail for business 
reasons—that is, it was not a fraud related failure—the issuer 
of the coin would not file an affidavit certifying the 
Substantial Steps Test. This would likely have two impacts. 
First, the coin would transition from being a simple piece of 
property to being a security. This would mean any sale of it by 
any person could not take place without registering the 
security or having an exemption from registration, such as a 
private placement pursuant to Regulation D. Second, the 
trading value of the coin could fall to zero, since the 
underlying business would no longer be viable as a means of 
assessing the coin’s fundamental value. 
4. A Note on Self-Regulatory Organizations 
In several instances above, this Article has made reference 
to a self-regulatory organization as a means of regulating 
digital assets. As one of the authors has written elsewhere, 
self-regulatory organizations—such as FINRA for 
stockbrokers—are a potentially elegant solution to the 
shortcomings of government regulation.142 A discussion of the 
advantages and disadvantages of SROs are beyond the scope 
of this Article, but we believe an SRO would be a welcome 
entity as a means of providing best practices or certification of 
traders in this market. Additionally, in accordance with the 
proposed solution, a SRO could act as a mechanism for 
registration and certification of compliance with the 
Substantial Steps Test. We expect that the SEC or other 
government regulators would lurk in the background, 
supervising any such SRO, as well as bringing civil or criminal 
charges against fraudsters in digital asset markets, just as in 
other markets. 
As of this writing, there are discussions underway among 
many major digital asset players to create a new self-
regulatory organization for digital asset markets.143 Known 
 
142 See William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth 
Branch, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2013). 
143 See, e.g., Nikhilesh De, CFTC Meeting Hears Renewed Calls for 
Crypto Self-Regulation, COINDESK (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com 
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as ADAM (Association for Digital Asset Markets), it would 
promulgate a voluntary code of conduct, with the possibility of 
evolving into a FINRA-like entity, or perhaps merely a 
platform to inform government regulators. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The rise of digital assets, made possible by innovations 
such as the distributed ledger and blockchains, poses a 
significant challenge to government regulators. Digital assets 
herald undeniable potential and risk. Because digital assets 
as a category do not fit neatly into existing regulatory 
buckets—currency, personal property, securities—but rather 
span all of them, most jurisdictions have yet to develop 
thoughtful regulation to create a fair and orderly market. This 
regulatory lacuna perpetuates fraud and a market that is not 
yet safe for institutional investors to enter with confidence. If 
the potential of digital assets is to be realized, a trustworthy 
infrastructure is needed. 
A centerpiece of such a reliable infrastructure is a 
characterization of digital assets that will enable both private 
and public regulators, as well as entrepreneurs, investors, and 
market makers, to know what they are dealing with. This 
Article has attempted a very rough sketch of the types of 
digital assets and how they fit into the existing legal tests for 
what qualifies as a security. Different digital assets can be 
analogized to currency, gold, or stock, to give just three 
examples. Being able to differentiate among different types of 
digital assets is vital for securities regulators, as well as other 
government entities. The implications of these 
characterizations are far reaching—for instance, tax 
treatment varies across asset classes in important ways. 
For our purposes, we offer two tests—the Bahamas Test 
and the Substantial Steps Test—as means of categorizing 
digital assets as securities or not. With this stake in the 
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so the market can move towards a workable definition that 
accounts for the unique promise and peril of digital assets.  
 
